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A commentary on
Congruency between word position and 
meaning is caused by task-induced spatial 
attention
by Pecher, D., Van Dantzig, S., Boot, I., Zanolie, 
K., and Huber, D. E. (2010). Front. Psychol. 
1:30. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00030
Pecher et al. (2010) presented targets (e.g., 
helicopter, submarine) up and down on a 
computer screen. Participants were either 
asked  to  indicate  whether  these  objects 
were typically found in the ocean, or typi-
cally found in the sky. The authors exam-
ined whether congruency effects between 
the  vertical  position  of  words  and  their 
meaning were best accounted for by mental 
simulations or by polarity benefits (default 
asymmetries  in  the  way  people  process 
dimensions).  I  believe  their  conclusion 
that polarity benefits cannot account for the 
interaction in reaction times between the 
meaning and the position of words is at best 
premature. Moreover, instead of explaining 
language understanding in terms of either 
simulation processes or linguistic input, a 
more fruitful approach might be to exam-
ine when meaning emerges from simulation 
processes, and when meaning is extracted 
from linguistic information (see Louwerse 
and Jeuniaux, 2010).
Pecher  and  colleagues  state  that 
“Certain  dimensions  are  always  coded 
in the same way.” (p. 2). Although it is 
true that people are by default faster to 
process above relationships compared to 
below relationships (Clark, 1969), studies 
have shown that this default processing 
benefit can easily be reversed, depending 
on the nature of the task and character-
istics of the stimuli. For example, Banks 
et al. (1975) asked participants to indicate 
which of two dots was located above (vs. 
below) the other. These dots were referred 
to as balloons, or as yo-yos. Participants 
were faster to   indicate which of the two 
dots was the higher balloon, whereas they 
were faster to judge which of the two dots 
was the lower yo-yo. The crossover pat-
tern observed in this study supports the 
idea  that  the  default  polarity  codes  of 
up as +polar and down as −polar can be 
reversed by framing the task in a different 
way. Proctor and Cho (2006, p. 428) simi-
larly conclude: “In two-choice tasks with 
orthogonal stimulus and response sets, the 
responses are coded relative to multiple 
frames of reference.”
A similar reframing occurs in the study 
performed by Pecher and colleagues. When 
thinking of skies, as in thinking of balloons, 
high  skies  are  the  default.  Therefore,  up 
becomes the default endpoint of the vertical 
dimension, and words presented up on the 
screen are responded to more quickly. When 
thinking of oceans, as when thinking of yo-
yos, the deep ocean is the default. Therefore, 
down becomes the default endpoint of the 
vertical dimension, and words presented 
down on the screen are responded to more 
quickly.  This  means  that  the  interaction 
between  task  and  position  reported  by 
Pecher and colleagues is an a priori predic-
tion of (and not evidence against) a polarity 
explanation.
The second polarity effect Pecher and col-
leagues investigate is based on the assump-
tion that right-hand key-presses receive a 
reaction time benefit because right is +polar. 
This prediction does not immediately fol-
low from previous theoretical or empirical 
work. One study has revealed that responses 
are faster for arrows pointing toward the 
right than to the left, but importantly, these 
effects are eliminated when arrows are sub-
stituted by words (Olson and Laxar, 1973), 
and seem to be limited to explicit spatial 
categorizations  where  right  key-presses 
are mapped onto stimuli presented up on 
the screen (Weeks and Proctor, 1990; Cho 
and Proctor, 2002). Furthermore, several 
researchers explicitly note that left-to-right 
space is symmetric, and should by default 
not reveal polarity differences (Clark, 1973; 
Seymour, 1974; Làdavas, 1988). Reaction 
time benefits for right key-presses are not 
ubiquitous in the literature, nor is such a 
main effect present in the study performed 
by Pecher and colleagues. Therefore, it is 
doubtful whether right key-presses should 
be coded as +polar.
Overall, the results of Pecher and col-
leagues  provide  little  evidence  against  a 
polarity explanation for congruency effects 
between word meaning and vertical posi-
tion. Given that previous studies that have 
investigated the vertical representation of 
concepts  often  show  that  +polar  words 
(e.g.,  powerful,  moral)  are  categorized 
faster than −polar words (i.e., powerless, 
immoral), and words presented up are cate-
gorized faster than words presented down, it 
seems premature to exclude polarity effects 
from influencing categorization times(e.g., 
Schubert, 2005; Meier et al., 2007). Indeed, 
as predicted by the polarity correspond-
ence principle (Proctor and Cho, 2006), 
these experiments typically do not reveal 
differences in the categorization times for 
–polar words presented up or down. At the 
same time, studies have revealed that words 
can direct attention upward or downward 
(Richardson et al., 2003; Bergen et al., 2007; 
Van Dantzig, 2009). Instead of attributing 
effects  to  either  simulation  processes  or 
polarity  effects,  several  researchers  have 
recently  proposed  models  of  conceptual 
processing that rely on both semantic and 
embodied  information  (Barsalou  et  al., 
2008;  Andrews  et  al.,  2009;  Louwerse, 
in press).
Such  an  interplay  between  linguistic 
and embodied sources of meaning might 
be  able  to  provide  a  more  integrative 
model  of  conceptual  thought,  especially 
for more abstract concepts. As an exam-
ple, consider Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) 
Conceptual  Metaphor  Theory  which 
describes  how  abstract  concepts  (e.g., 
power, valence, morality) are mapped onto 
concrete dimensions (e.g., verticality, size, 
brightness). These mappings are argued to 
result from experiential co-occurrence of Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 21  |  2
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the abstract and concrete domains, such 
as drooped postures when we feel down. 
This  reasoning  cannot  explain  the  fact 
that practically all conceptual metaphors 
map abstract + polar concepts onto con-
crete + polar endpoints of dimensions (e.g., 
happy = up, warmth = affection, power-
ful = large) and vice versa (see Krzeszowski, 
1997). Perhaps linguistic structures such as 
polarity differences constrain the specific 
mappings  that  emerge  between  abstract 
and concrete dimensions, thereby shaping 
how concepts are grounded.
Activated  word  associations,  statisti-
cal regularities in language, and linguistic 
structures can guide simulation processes 
(for examples, see Barsalou et al., 2008; 
Louwerse  and  Jeuniaux,  2010),  and 
should be taken into account when aim-
ing  to  explain  language  comprehension. 
Linguistic and concrete information both 
contribute  to  conceptual  thought;  the 
challenge for future research lies in speci-
fying  how  meaning  emerges  from  their 
dynamic interaction.
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